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NOTES AND COMMENT
EVIDENCE: CONTRADICTION OF COLLATERAL MATTER-It has been
said so many times that a party is concluded by the answers of a witness on any collateral matter, that the real rule and the reasons therefor
are very generally misunderstood and frequently misapplied.
Some cases and some textbooks draw a very clear distinction between
impeachment as applied to a collateral matter and contradiction as applied to a collateral matter. The distinguishing feature seems to be found
in whether or not the answer sought to be refuted is elicited on direct
examination or cross-examination. If an answer given on direct examination is to be disproven it is called contradiction. If an answer
elicited on cross-examination is to be disproven it is called impeachment.
It is obvious, of course, that this is all a matter of definition and despite
a confusion of terms the question of refuting answers elicited either
on direct or cross-examination is really a matter of impeachment and
by the better writers is generally called impeachment by contradiction.
Definitions are not particularly material to our present inquiry as we
are here chiefly interested in applying this rule of evidence to collateral
matters.
The term "collateral matter" is frequently misunderstood. A test
of whether a matter is collateral is: Is the cross-examining party
entitled to prove the matter in support of his case?'
First, considering collateral matter elicited on cross-examination, the
rule is well settled in all jurisdictions that a party is bound by the
answers thus obtained. 2 It is this rule, so well and firmly settled, that
has confused lawyers and judges alike concerning the right of a person
to contradict answers given on a collateral matter in direct-examination.
"The general rule is that, when a witness is cross-examined on a matter
collateral to the issue, his answer cannot be subsequently contradicted
by the party putting the question, but this limitation only applies to
answers on the cross-examnnation. It does not affect answers to the
"3s
examination in chief.
There is authority to the contrary. 4 This line of authority states

110 Exer. PL. & Pa. 996; 'WnuATo's Cam. Bv., Tenth Edition, § 484, and
cases there cited.
-28 R. C. L. 620; 10 Excr Py- & Pa. 295.
'McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 431, 27 S. W 628 (1894) Furst v. Second
Ave. R. O., 72 N. Y. 54

(1878)

Van Tassell v. New York, etc., R. Co, 20

N. Y. Supp. 708 (1892), -1 N. Y. Supp. 1131, 37 N. E. 566 (1893), State v.
Goodwin, 32 W Va. 177, 9 S. E. 85 (1889) People v. Roemer 114 Cal. 51,

45 Pac. 1003 (1896), People v. Evans, 41 Pac. 444 (Cal., 1895) Grimes V.
Hill, 15 Colo. 359, -5 Pac. 698 (1891) Batdor/f v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 61 Pa.
St. 179 (1869), Forde v. Com., 16 Gratt (Va.) 547 (1864) Butler v. State, 31

Ark. 480 (1879), State v. Sargent, 3- Me. 429 (1851) Polk v. State, 40 Ark.
482 (1833), 98 R. C. L. 620; Wharton's Cialm. Ev., Tenth Edition, §484, and
notes.

'Lambert v.Hamlin, 73 N. H. 138, 59 AUt. 941, 6 Ann. Cas. 713 (1905),
Merchants' L. Assoc. v. Yoakum, 98 Fed. 251, 39 C. C. A. 56 (1899) Blakey v.
Blakey, 33 Ala. 611 (1859) overruling Dozier v. Joyce, 8 Port. (Ala.) 303;
Ortez v. Jewett, 23 Ala. 66- (1853), Com. v. Fitzgerald, 0 Allen (Mass.) 297
(1861),

Bhrman v. Whelan, 40 So. 430 (Miss., 1906)

Bullock v. State, 65

N. J. L. 557, 47 AUt. 62 (1900) State v. Hendrick, 70 N. J. L. 41, 56 AtL 247
(1903) Continental Nat. Bank v. Nashville First Nat. Bank, 108 Tenn. 374,
68 S.W 497 (1902), Craig v. Rohrer, 63 Ill.
325 (1872).
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the rule as follows: "The question is whether the statement of an
immaterial fact can be contradicted, if it comes out on the examination
of a witness in chief.
It seems to us that if an immaterial fact is
stated by a witness of his own accord, or as introductory merely to
material testimony, or if the party who calls a witness is permitted,
without objection, to question him as to immaterial facts, the irrelevant
testimony must be regarded in the same manner as if it had come out
on cross-examination,
and the other party cannot call witnesses to
5
contradict

it."

The reasons advanced in support of this line of authority to many
courts appears very persuasive. They place their holding usually on
two grounds1. If contradiction is allowed on collateral matters elicited on direct
examination, the result would be a confusion of issues,
2. If a party is so careless, negligent and sleepy as to permit collateral
matters to be injected in a direct examination that party should not be
permitted to take advantage of the situation.
The contrary rule that collateral matter elicited on direct examination can be contradicted is based on several grounds, the most usual of
which is that the collateral matter was injected by a party to better his
position before the court and is frequently permitted to go into the
record on counsel's statement that it is merely preliminary It does
seem unreasonable, particularly in a criminal case where the rule has
a very powerful sway, that a defendant may thus unfairly place himself
in a desirable position before the court. For example. Supposing a
defendant charged with burglary gets on the witness stand and in
rapid succession makes a series of statements to the effect that he has
been a minister of the gospel, that he has never touched intoxicating
liquor, used dope, etc. Now if these matters had been elicited on crossexamination by the prosecuting attorney, the state probably would be
bound thereby under the rule above noted, but here the defendant has
improved his position before the court and jury by a series of false
statements. In fairness, and bearing in mind the danger, in the eyes
of the jury, of objecting to a defendant giving a bit of his life history,
the state should not be denied the opportunity of contradicting those
statements.
In the state of Washington this particular point has not been passed
upon by our own Supreme Court. In every case in which the question
has arisen on appeal the contradiction sought to be admitted resulted
from an answer elicited on cross-examination. 6 In some cases our
Com. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 153 (1834).
Among these cases are:
State v. Carpenter 32 Wash. 254 (1903) State v. McLain, 43 Wash. 267,
271, (86 Pac. 390, 2) (1906) Anderson v. Globe Nay. Co., 57 Wash. 502, 506;
107 Pac. 376, 7 (1910) Wharton v. Tacoma Fir Door Co., 58 Wash. 124, 125 •
107 Pac. 1057, 8 (1910) Kirk v. Seattle Jlectrzc Co., 58 Wash. 983, 289 108
Pac. 604, 7 (1910)
Finigan v. Sullivan, 65 Wash. 625, 627 118 Pac. 888, 9
(1911) State v. Stone, 66 Wash. 625, 631, 120 Pac. 76, 8 (191-).
6
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Supreme Court has ruled that the contradiction was properly admitted
because it was contradiction of a material matter elicited on crossexamination.7
It is, therefore, yet an open question what our own Supreme Court
will do, but if it follows the weight of authority and what, it is submitted, is the weight of reason it will adopt the rule that answers
elicited on direct examination on collateral matters may be contradicted.
Robert S. Macfarlane.

MAY A MAN PROVIDE IN His WILL THAT His WIFE SHALL NOT
TAKE UNDER IT UNLESS SHE SHALL SURVIVE HIM FOR A PERIOD OF
FORTY-EIGHT Houas?-The advantages are apparent that might be
gained by a man including in his will the provision that his wife should
not take under it unless she should survive him for a period of, say,
forty-eight hours. As an example, there is the famous French case of
Fair v. Vanderbilt, in which both spouses were killed, the wife surviving the husband fifty-nine seconds, and of which a learned author
once remarked, "It was the first time in history that a man and his
wife were ever killed while riding together." No provision had been
made in contemplation of either co-accidental or incidental death.
These two vast estates became merged into one. How much more
equitable it would have beeri to let the estates remain in the respective
families. Due to this sudden and unexpected death, one family was
enriched, to the detriment of the other. Who can say this was a just
enrichment, using this principle as a comparison, and that such a distribution was any other than a mere interpretation of words in a will
or statute?
Every practicing attorney knows of some local application of this
distribution in his community. Because of the risk of automobile or
similar accident, each spouse may advantageously incorporate a clause
in his will providing for just such contingencies. Would such a will,
then, be permissible in Washington? Objections may be raised that
the statutes as they now exist are mandatory, in a way that would
prevent such a will, that such a provision would leave the title to
devised property nowhere during the interim, that the court would
declare an intestacy. It may even be urged that the same result may
be effected through some established form, such a life estate.
The statutes which must be taken into consideration are as follows:
Remington's Compiled Statutes §1366 reads: "When a person dies
seized of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any right thereto or
entitled to any interest therein in fee or for life of another, his title
shall vest immediately in his heirs or devisees, subject to his debts,
family allowance, expenses of administration and any other charges
for which such real estate is liable under existing laws. No adminis"Allard v. Nlorthwestern Contract Co., 61 Wash. 14, 116 Pae. 457 (1911)
State v. Hood, 103
Wash. 489, 491, 175 Pac. 27, 8 (1918).
MclVall v. Sandygren, 100 Wash. 133, 170 Pac. 561 (1918)

